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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Randall Jerome Billups appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to traffic heroin.

On appeal, Billups

challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Detective Kyle Ludwig responded to a call for service from the Postal
Annex after it received a package containing heroin. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.4, Ls.1315.) Employees at the Postal Annex advised Detective Ludwig that packages to
the addressee were “typically picked up” by a “white female” “immediately” after
the packages arrived. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.5, Ls.4-8.) Detective Ludwig instructed
the postal staff to deliver the package “as they normally would.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr.,
p.5, Ls.8-10.)
Detective Ludwig was notified once the package was collected from the
Postal Annex, after which he attempted to locate the car the “white female” was
driving when she picked it up.

(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.6, Ls.7-16.)

That car

“relocated” from the annex to a nearby parking lot. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.6, Ls.1120.) The car was parked by a dumpster in that parking lot for a very brief period
before leaving. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.1.) Law enforcement “lost the
vehicle” for a “short period of time” before relocating it, at which time Detective
Ludwig conducted a traffic stop. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.7, Ls.2-21.)
There were two occupants in the car when Detective Ludwig made
contact with it. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.7, L.23 – p.8, L.2, p.9, Ls.14-15.) Billups was
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the passenger, and Alex Hoffman was the driver; Hoffman was also one of two
registered owners on the post office box to which the heroin package was
delivered. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.5, Ls.13-16, p.9, Ls.12-13.) Detective Ludwig could
see inside the vehicle and noticed portions of the heroin package he previously
identified at the Postal Annex sitting on the center console. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.8,
Ls.10-18.) Following a positive canine alert, a search of the car uncovered a
digital scale and a “pay/owe ledger sheet” inside a bag that was sitting on the
passenger side floorboard. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.9, L.11.) The ledger
included a reference to Billups. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.15, Ls.11-17.) Although the
heroin was not found in the car, it was subsequently discovered in an area
search of “trash bins.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.9.)
“Based on the items recovered in the vehicle,” and Detective Ludwig’s
“knowledge of the contents of the package from the Postal Annex,” Detective
Ludwig had Billups and Hoffman “transported to the Meridian Police Department
for further questioning.”

(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, Ls.17-24.)

At the police
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department, Detective Ludwig read Billups Miranda warnings after which Billups

“admitted . . . that he was a heroin user; that he knew that he was travelling with
Ms. Hoffman to pick up the package of heroin and that he would assist Ms.
Hoffman in the sale of that heroin,” and “would be paid with heroin” as a “kick[ ]
down” for “setting up the deals.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.12, L.6 – p.13, L.4.)
The state charged Billups with conspiracy to traffic in heroin. (R., pp.4143, 51-53.)
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Billups filed a motion to suppress “all evidence, physical and

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

testimonial, obtained or derived from or through or as a result of [his] unlawful
search, seizure, interrogation, arrest, and detention.” (R., pp.101-102.) Billups
argued suppression was proper because he was “illegally detained . . . without
an arrest or search warrant.”

(R., p.102.)

The district court denied Billups’

suppression motion. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, L.1 – p.31, L.19.)
The jury found Billups guilty of the charged offense. (R., p.200.) The
court imposed the mandatory minimum fixed ten year sentence. (R., pp.203205.) Billups timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.211-214.)
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ISSUE
Billups states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Billups’s motion
to suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Billups failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because the evidence shows there was probable cause to arrest
Billups when he was transported to the police department where he made the
incriminating statements he sought to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Billups Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
Because The Evidence Supports The Conclusion That There Was Probable
Cause To Arrest Billups When He Was Transported To The Police Department
Where He Made The Incriminating Statements He Sought To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Billups challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that

“officers seized [him] without probable cause and took him to the police station,
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) Billups’
argument fails because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
supports the conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest Billups when he
was transported to the police station for further questioning. The district court’s
denial of Billups’ motion to suppress should, therefore, be affirmed.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
C.

Billups Was Not Entitled To Suppression Because There Was Probable
Cause To Arrest Him At The Time Of His Detention
Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must

be supported by probable cause.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700

(1981); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
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“Reasonable or

probable cause for an arrest exists where the officer possesses information that
would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.” State v. Buti, 131
Idaho 793, 798, 964 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).

The

evaluation of probable cause “must take into account the factual and practical
consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.” Id. “In determining whether there is probable cause for an
arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the available
information in light of the knowledge that he has gained from his previous
experience and training.”

Id.

Probable cause does not require an actual

showing of criminal activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of
such activity. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-245 n.13 (1983). The probable
cause standard necessary for an arrest “must be distinguished from the burden
of proof that is borne by the State at trial” because “[t]he adequacy of probable
cause is not measured against the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that is required for conviction.” State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 510, 5
P.3d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 2000).
Application of the law to the facts established at the suppression hearing
supports the conclusion that Detective Ludwig had probable cause to arrest
Billups when he took Billups to the police station for further questioning. When
Detective Ludwig ordered Billups’ transport, he was aware of the following
information:

(1) Billups was with Hoffman when she picked up a package

containing heroin from the Postal Annex; (2) a portion of that package, which
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had been opened, was on the center console when Hoffman’s vehicle was
stopped shortly after leaving the Postal Annex; (3) a digital scale and a ledger
that included a reference to Billups were discovered inside a bag on the
passenger side floorboard near where Billups was sitting; and (4) although the
heroin itself was not in the car at the time of the traffic stop, the car had been
seen parked temporarily next to a dumpster shortly after the package was picked
up from the Postal Annex, and the officers briefly lost sight of the car before the
traffic stop was effectuated, which would have given Billups and Hoffman time to
discard the heroin if they realized that the package had already been opened
before it was picked up and/or realized they were being followed. (Supp. Hrg.
Tr., p.6, L.10 – p.7, L.9, p. 8, L.19 – p.9, L.11, p.15, Ls.11-17.) At a minimum,
this was sufficient “information that would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion” that Billups was
guilty of criminal conduct in relation to the heroin and/or paraphernalia. Maryland
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), is instructive.
In Pringle, police stopped a car with three people in it. Id. at 368. They
searched the car after obtaining consent from the driver and found a large
amount of cash in a roll in the glove compartment and baggies of cocaine tucked
behind the folded-up armrest in the back seat. Id. After all three men in the car
denied knowledge of the drugs and cash, officers arrested all three. Id. at 36869. Pringle, the front-seat passenger, later admitted that the drugs and cash
were his. Id. After being convicted, Pringle appealed the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence, asserting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. at
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369. The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed and held that, “absent specific facts
tending to show Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the
mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was a front seat
passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable
cause for an arrest for possession.” Id. at 369 (internal quotes and brackets
omitted).

However, this analysis was unanimously rejected by the Supreme

Court of the United States. Id. at 370-74.
The

Supreme

Court

reiterated

that

probable

cause

deals with

“probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances” and consists of a
“reasonable ground for belief of guilt” that is “particularized with respect to the
person to be searched or seized.” Id. at 371 (internal quotes omitted). “Finely
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the
probable-cause decision.”

Id. (internal quotes and brackets omitted).

It

reasoned that the presence of cocaine and a significant amount of cash in the
car where it was accessible to all three occupants, in combination with the three
occupants having provided no information as to ownership of the cash or
cocaine, created “an entirely reasonable inference … that any or all three of the
occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the
cocaine.” Id. at 373.
Zentner is also instructive. In Zentner, an officer initiated a traffic stop
after observing a car with two broken taillights. 134 Idaho at 509, 5 P.3d at 489.
Although the officer turned on her overhead lights in an effort to stop the car, the
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driver continued traveling while the “occupants were moving around excessively.”
Id. The driver eventually stopped, but “could not produce a driver’s license, proof
of insurance or a vehicle registration.” Id. Further investigation revealed that the
license plates on the car were registered to a different automobile, and that one
of the passengers had a stun gun. Id. “Due to the stun gun information,” the
officer frisked one of the occupants and discovered “he had a bag of dope in his
pocket.” Id. After arresting that individual, the officer “noticed a bag containing a
powder substance in a hole in the front dashboard.” Id. Zentner, who was sitting
in the backseat, was removed from the vehicle and frisked, but the officer “did
not find anything on his person, and he was not arrested” at that time.

Id.

However, after a subsequent search of the car uncovered the bag in the
dashboard, which contained methamphetamine, a “dollar bill rolled up into a tube
shape in the glove box and a backpack on the backseat that contained scales
with a white powder residue and nine baggies containing methamphetamine,”
Zentner was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia.
Id. A search incident to Zentner’s arrest revealed he had methamphetamine
concealed in his sock. Id.
“Zentner filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine found during
the post-arrest search at the jail.” Zentner, 134 Idaho at 509, 5 P.3d at 489.
Zentner “argued that he had been unlawfully arrested without probable cause
and that the methamphetamine was found as a result of the unlawful arrest.” Id.
On appeal, Zentner further argued that “probable cause was lacking because he
was not the sole occupant of the vehicle and there was nothing in the backpack
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indicating that the backpack or the drugs belonged to him as distinguished from
the driver or the other passenger.” Id. at 510, 5 P.3d at 490. The Court rejected
this argument, reasoning:
The facts known to the officers at the time of Zentner’s
arrest include not only the proximity of the backpack to Zentner as
he was situated in the backseat of the vehicle, but also Deputy
Knisley’s observation, while attempting to stop the vehicle, that all
three occupants were moving excessively about the interior of the
car for a period before the driver finally brought the vehicle to a
stop. From this excessive activity, followed by the discovery of
drugs in the automobile, an officer could reasonably infer that all of
the occupants had been taking steps to conceal the contraband in
the car. This evidence, together with Zentner’s physical position on
the seat next to the backpack, would lead a prudent person to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Zentner had
knowledge and control of the contraband in the backpack.
Although the evidence might have been insufficient to convict
Zent[n]er for possession of the drugs in the backpack, it was
adequate to create probable cause for his arrest.
Zentner, 134 Idaho at 511, 5 P.3d at 491 (emphasis original).
Similar to the defendants in Pringle and Zentner, Billups’ presence in the
car, and his proximity to the heroin package and the paraphernalia, which
included a ledger referencing him, was sufficient to establish probable cause to
believe Billups had both knowledge and dominion and control over the package
that had contained the heroin, and/or the paraphernalia in the bag located on the
floorboard at his feet, and probable cause to believe that he facilitated disposal
of the heroin prior to the traffic stop. Although the evidence at that time may
have been less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a
preponderance, it was certainly a reasonable inference for officers to conclude
that persons present in the car at the time the heroin was picked up from the
Postal Annex would have knowledge of the heroin and of the paraphernalia

10

associated with heroin sales that was discovered in the car. The police did not
have to assume that Billups was oblivious to the drug activity around him.
Because officers had probable cause to arrest Billups when he was handcuffed
and transported to the police department for questioning, Billups’ subsequent
statements and the text messages found on his phone were not subject to
suppression.
On appeal, Billups contends he was entitled to suppression because, he
argues, he was seized “without probable cause.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) In
support of his argument, Billups indicates that he “agrees with the State’s
concession, and the district court’s finding, that officers had no probable cause to
arrest him until after he provided the incriminating evidence” and argues that the
district court’s “finding that officers did not need to have probable cause to detain
him and transport him involuntarily to the police station is directly in contradiction
to United States Supreme Court precedent.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (citing Supp.
Hrg. Tr., p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5; p.27, L.1 – p.31, L.2).) The state agrees that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dunaway supports Billups’ assertion that he was
effectively arrested when he was handcuffed and transported to the police
department for questioning.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10 (citing Dunaway, 442

U.S. 200).) However, because there was probable cause to arrest Billups at that
time, there was no Fourth Amendment violation that would entitle him to
suppression of the statements, or other incriminating evidence, he provided
following his de facto arrest. This is true even if the prosecutor did not believe
there was probable cause, and even if the district court erroneously concluded
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there was reasonable suspicion but not probable cause. See State v. Newman,
149 Idaho 596, 600 n.1, 237 P.3d 1222, 1226 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010) (“on appeal,
this Court is not limited by the prosecutor’s argument or the absence thereof” in
relation to a suppression motion); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d
424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005) (although factual findings are accepted if supported by
substantial evidence, whether the evidence satisfies the probable cause
standard is reviewed de novo). As to Billups’ latter argument, that the district
court found a lack of probable cause, that assertion is contradicted by the district
court’s statement that “[t]here was probable cause to detain both Ms. Hoffman
and Mr. Billups for an investigatory investigation.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, Ls.2-4.)
Although the district court followed this statement with a finding that “[t]here was
a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed,” it is
unclear whether that statement was directed toward the initial basis for the stop
as opposed to Billups’ arrest. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, Ls.4-9; see also p.31, Ls.1013.) Even if the district court did not mean “probable cause” when it used the
words “probable cause,” because the probable cause determination is subject to
free review, and because the existence of probable cause was placed squarely
before the court in Billups’ suppression motion (R., pp.101-102; see also p.111),
the district court’s phraseology is ultimately irrelevant. For the reasons already
stated, the probable cause standard was satisfied in this case. Billups has failed
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to show otherwise.2
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
denial of Billups’ motion to suppress.
DATED this 4th day of November, 2016.
__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of November, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

2

The state agrees with Billups that the Miranda warnings preceding his
statements would not cure any Fourth Amendment violation that would require
suppression of those statements. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219. The state
also concedes that, if Billups’ statements should have been suppressed, any
error in admission of those statements at trial would not be harmless.
13

